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n order to analyze competition in gas markets, an intermediate activity of storage is included
in a classical model of vertical relations. In that case, firms can inject or withdraw
strategically natural gas resource. The access to the storage facility can deteriore the welfare
since it incites the vertically integrated firms (production and distribution) to withdraw
strategically. This incentive is reduced by vertical integration between storage and
distribution. Thus it improves the social welfare.
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Abstract
In order to analyze competition in gas markets, an intermediate activity of storage is included
in a classical model of vertical relations. In that case, ﬁrms can inject or withdraw strategically
natural gas resource. The access to the storage facility can deteriore the welfare since it incites
the vertically integrated ﬁrms (production and distribution) to withdraw strategically. This
incentive is reduced by vertical integration between storage and distribution. Thus it improves
the social welfare.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L10, L50, Q40
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I. Introduction
In the member States of European Union, competition has been introduced in the gas sector in
1998. Five years later, many reports underline the diﬃculties to achieve a complete deregulation in
this sector. Anti-competitive behaviors are frequently observed, specially concerning transportation
activity which is ensured by the so-called historical ﬁrm. In the upstream part of the gas chain,
similar anti-competitive behaviors can occur. Natural gas resource is an essential factor into the
supplier’s production process. Thereby, the strategic vertical integration of oil and gas companies
that supply gas directly to ﬁnal consumers could slow down the deregulation process in European
gas market (see for example Baranes et al. (2003)).
In the intermediate market, the activity of storage has an inﬂuence on the deregulation process
in energy markets. In this way, the European Commission underlines the necessity of Third Party
Access to Natural Gas Storage (TPAS) in order to stimulate competition and to promote entry into
deregulated markets by new actors1. Some questions must be cleared, in this context: will the access
of storage be regulated or negotiated? What is the most relevant criterion which allows to attribute
limited capacities of storage facilities under TPAS system? Will some particular and new functions
devoted to storage be developed in European gas markets? Will the total capacity of facilities must
be opened or will one part of this capacity must be reserved for some public service missions ?
The aim of this article is to analyze the issue of storage when oil and gas companies on upstream
market compete with suppliers on downstream market.
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1November 25th 2004, the Ministers of members States responsible for the Energy sector have signed an agreement
which stipulates that storage facilities will be opened to competitors in 2004.
1In the theoretical literature, storage is a facility which contributes to the matching of gas supply
and gas demand at a seasonal and daily level. In addition, storage is analyzed in the framework of
oligopolistic competition. Kirman and Sobel (1974) and Philps and Richard (1989) analyze the role
of storage in the intertemporal price discrimination framework. The strategic role of storage was
initially studied by Saloner (1987) and Pal (1991). Storage plays a strategic role if it modiﬁes the
decisions of rival ﬁrms for the future periods. In that case, storage is viewed as a mean of achieving a
strategic advance production plan (see Saloner (1987) and Pal (1991)). Poddar, Sasaki (2002) study
the incentives for the ﬁrm to store in a simultaneous game.
This theoretical literature focuses only on storage of an output. However, in vertically organized
industries (e.g. industries of networks), inputs can also be stored. In this framework, possibility
of storage can modify the strategic decisions of the ﬁrms on upstream and downstream markets.
Reciprocally, the vertical structure of the industry (integration or unbundling) could inﬂuence also
the decisions concerning the storage of the input.
Literature on vertical relationships is already well developed. Gaudet and Van Long (1996) present
an extension of Salinger (1988). In this paper, they allow the vertically integrated ﬁrms to make
strategic purchase of intermediate good. In that case, the integrated ﬁrms have the possibility to
buy intermediate goods, as well as downstream ﬁrms do. When the integrated ﬁrm makes a negative
supply (strategic demand), there is a positive eﬀect on the intermediate price because the ﬁrm is
price maker on the upstream market. This strategy of the integrated ﬁrm (strategic purchases) allows
the ﬁrm to strategically adjust the price on the intermediate market. In that case, the ﬁrm has the
possibility to increase the cost of its competitors on downstream market (raising rival’s costs).
In our model, we adopt the framework developed by Gaudet and Van Long (1996), in order
to focus on the strategic aspects of storage in gas sector. Indeed, access to storage (viewed as an
essential facility) allows the ﬁrms to use it in a strategic way. Our model focuses on cases where
access to storage facilities allows rival ﬁrms to adjust strategically the gas price on downstream
market. We have such a situation when the competitive suppliers are integrated with an upstream
oil and gas company. For the industrial structures studied here, we show that TPAS allows the
vertically integrated ﬁrm (active on both upstream and downstream markets) to strategically rise
the intermediate market price in order to increase the cost of the downstream independent ﬁrm. In
these cases, it seems better from the point of view of welfare to alleviate this strategical behavior by
means of the vertical integration of storage operator (when access to storage is opened).
We focus on strategic eﬀects related to the TPAS when one of the downstream market competitors
is integrated with an upstream oil and gas company. More precisely, we study two diﬀerent industrial
structures: separated TPAS (S) and integrated TPAS (I). The industrial structure S represents the
situation in which access to storage facility is allowed to the integrated ﬁrm (i.e. TPAS) in order
to inject or to withdraw gas. In that case, the activity of storage is independent. The structure
I represents a situation of TPAS in which the activity of storage is vertically integrated with a
downstream supplier.
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies the case of the industrial structure S in which
the activity of storage is independent. Section 4 analyzes the eﬀect of an integration of storage with
a supplier (I). Finally, section 5 gives some further results with a linear demand function and the
last section is devoted to conclusions.
II. The model
In our framework, the industrial structure of the gas market distinguishes three vertically organized
markets: the upstream gas production, the downstream gas distribution and an intermediate level,
which is the storage activity. We consider that production and distribution markets are duopolies
2while the storage activity is insured by a monopoly. This conﬁguration is supposed to be a good
approximation of the competition on the whole gas chain, implying further the use of a storage
capacity which can be considered as an essential facility. On the other hand, we suppose that the
gas routing from the upstream to downstream level requires that non integrated ﬁrms use the gas
storage facility and consequently support an access cost.2
In our model, gas production is devoted to two ﬁrms (oil and gas companies) indexed by j =1 ,2.
The selling price of that production is denoted by k, and is determined by competition in quantities










where Y = y1+y2 and k (Y ) is the inverse demand function on the intermediate market. The produced
quantity yj by an oil and gas ﬁrm j that is integrated with downstream suppliers is corresponding to
a net supply (that is the production level less the quantity necessary for supplying the downstream
demand). If that net supply is negative, it represents a demand for gas on the intermediate market.
For every unity produced, a cost Cu
j is borne. This cost can be divided in two parts: a (unit and
marginal) cost of production γ and an access charge to the storage facility. Without any loss of
generality, we normalize this marginal cost of production γ to zero. So when the net supply is
negative, Cu
j the cost of production of the ﬁrm is just equal to the storage withdrawal price noted a
then Cu
j = −a. In the case of a positive net supply, this cost can be reduced to Cu
j = i where i is the
storage injection price.
The natural downstream gas market supply is insured by 2 ﬁrms indexed by h =1 ,2 and we
assume again Cournot competition among them. The inverse demand function on the downstream
market is denoted by P(Q). We assume normal demand4 for the product, that is P 0(Q) < 0.A
(downstream) supplier h proﬁt is then written:
π
d
h (qh,q −h)=P (Q)qh − (k + a)qh
with Q = q1 + q2.
F i n a l l yw ea s s u m et h a tas i n g l eﬁrm is in charge of the storage activity and we denote c the
marginal cost of storage. In the case of a Third Party Access to Storage Facilities (TPAS), the
storage ﬁrm’s proﬁti s :
πs =( a − c)S +( i − c)I
where S is the gas amount withdrew from the stock. It corresponds to the ﬁnal market demand
to which are added the possible demands of the upstream producers (negative net supply), that is
S = q1 + q2 −
P
j∈Js yj, where Js = {j|yj < 0}. The variable I represents the injected gas amount
and it is just equal to the upstream market supplies (positive net supply), that is I =
P
j∈JI yj,
where Ji = {j|yj ≥ 0}. From now, we normalize to zero, the marginal cost of storage that is c =0
5.
In the following sections, we study more precisely the case where an entirely integrated ﬁrm
(precisely integration of h =2and j =2 ) competes with an independent supplier (h =1 )o nt h e
ﬁnal market. The following ﬁgure illustrates this structure:
2Access to the storage facility is not necessary for an enterely integrated supplier ; it is the case for example when
the gas can be directly transported by liquiﬁed natural gas carriers.
3The superior index u indicates an upstream oil and gas ﬁrm. Identically, the superior index d indicates a downstream
supplying ﬁrm.
4We also assume that it is not too convex, in the sense where the function Γ(Q)=2 P (Q)+P0 (Q)Q is non
increasing w.r.t. Q ≥ 0. In other words, the slope of the inverse demand function is greater than −(n+1),w h e r en is
the number of active ﬁrms. Here n+1 =3 . This assumption is standard in oligopoly theory and guarantees existence
and uniqueness of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium (see for example X. Vives 2000).
5This simpliﬁcation is harmless here because the storage activity is not envisioned within its dynamic dimension.
This implies the permanent balance between the entering and outgoing ﬂows within the stock.
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As in Gaudet and Van Long (1996), we consider in this model that the issue of the upstream
supply in entirely solved by the variable y2. The integrated ﬁrm’s proﬁt6 may be written as:
Π2 (q2,q 1,y 2,y 1)=P (Q)q2 +( k − C
u
2)y2
Thereafter, we consider a situation where ﬁrms engage in competition àl aCournot on the upstream
market and on the intermediate market, that is a bilateral oligopoly framework. More exactly, we
study a two-stage game: in a ﬁrst stage, the oil and gas companies determine their strategies of
production and in a second stage the downstream suppliers compete on the ﬁnal market. We look
for the subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
III. Competition and independent storage
In this section, we consider a vertical structure (S)i nw h i c ht h ei n t e g r a t e dﬁrm (ﬁrm 2) has an open
access to the storage facility and thus can inject or withdraw some gas. In addition, the activity of
storage is independent.


















This equilibrium couple is then implicitly deﬁned by the necessary ﬁrst order conditions:
P (Q










with Qs = qs
1 +qs
2,w h e r eQs is the equilibrium supply level put on the ﬁnal market. By assumption,
this variable is a part of S, the amount withdrew from the gas inventory. These conditions can be
rewritten using the well known Lerner rules:











where η(·) is the price elasticity of demand. We recognize here the traditional relation between the
Lerner index, the price elasticity of demand and the active ﬁrms’ market share sh.
6The cost of the access to storage is booked only once (because the gas resource is internally supplied). It corresponds
to the injection price i if the net supply is positive or to the withdrawal price a in the negative case.
7We only focus here on interior equilibria.




This result stems directly from Lerner rules expressed above. From this market share ranking,
we can say the vertical integration allows the ﬁrm j =2to by-pass the storage facility and to get a
competitive advantage.
From this downstream market equilibrium, it is now possible to express intermediate market
demand. This inverse demand is given by b k =( qn
1)
−1 (Y ), the intermediate (upstream) supply being
equal to Y = y1 + y2. The cost of access (injection/withdrawal) Cu
j then depends on the sign of the
net supply, yj.
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the Cournot equilibrium8 is denoted (ys
1,ys
2),a n dd e t e r m i n e db y
the following relations:





b ξ (Y s)
and
b ks − Cu





b ξ (Y s)
≶ 0 (2)
The independent ﬁrm supports only the cost of production Cu
1. By contrast, the integrated ﬁrm
supports an additionally marginal cost P0 (Qs)qs
2 < 0. This marginal cost represents for the ﬁrm









of its upstream strategy on its downstream supply. In this
case, the quantity produced by the integrated ﬁrm induces two opposite eﬀects on its proﬁt: a direct
positive eﬀect on its upstream proﬁt( q u a n t i t ye ﬀect linked to the margin b k−Cu
2)a n das t r a t e g i ce ﬀect
on its downstream proﬁt (indirect eﬀect). This last eﬀect shows that an increase of the production of
that integrated ﬁrm leads to a fall in the intermediate market price. Then this strategic eﬀect beneﬁts
to the downstream independent ﬁrm: its costs are decreasing and thus it can develop a competitive
advantage in the downstream market (relatively to the integrated ﬁrm). The decision of producing
the amount y2 precisely incorporates the trade-oﬀ between the direct and strategic eﬀects.






Consequently, we can derive from this last result that both ﬁrms cannot inject or withdraw simulta-
neously in the stock.
Lemma 2 If one of the upstream ﬁrms is withdrawing at the equilibrium, it is necessarily the inte-
grated one.
Proof. Assume that the independent upstream ﬁrm withdraws so ys
1 ≤ 0. Relations (2) then imply:
b ks+a
b ks > 1. But in this case, the independent downstream supplier’s market share is negative by





b ξ(Y s) ≤ 0.
Consequently we can see that at the equilibrium, the independent ﬁrm injects a certain amount
of gas in the stock so ys
1 > 0. Then (2) writes now:




b ξ (Y s)
> 0 and
b ks − Cu





b ξ (Y s)
≷ 0 (3)
The integrated ﬁrm’s strategy on the intermediate market thus depends very strongly on the shape of
the demand function b k on this market and more generally on the ﬁnal market demand. Thus, at this
stage of the analysis, we cannot exclude any of the three types of equilibria: those with an injection
strategy (yj > 0)f r o mt h ei n t e g r a t e dﬁrm, those with withdrawal (yj < 0) or those with foreclosure
8We suppose the interior equilibrium does exist that is (qn
1)
−1 (Y ) is not too convex.
5(yj =0 ). Then everything depends on the scope of the direct eﬀect with regard to the strategic
eﬀect. When the direct eﬀect (respectively the strategic eﬀect) dominates the strategic eﬀect (resp.
the direct eﬀect), the integrated ﬁrm should rather sell (resp. buy) on the intermediate market and
thus inject (resp. withdraw) some gas in the stock. A foreclosure equilibrium, such that ys






2 > b k
s − i
IV. Competition and integrated storage
In this section, we suppose that the storage is vertically integrated with the downstream supplier 1.
The proﬁt function of the integrated storage writes now
Π1 (q1,q 2)=π
d
1 + πs =( P (Q) − k − c)q1 + ab S + iI
where b S = −
P
j∈Js yj, with Js = {j|yj < 0}.
This market structure has similar characteristics to the previous scenario S and the downstream
market equilibrium is similar to the equilibrium described by the relation 1. However, the cost of
supply of the independent ﬁrm 1 is now lower because the access charge is not paid anymore. Thus
k +a becomes k. We can show (see the appendix for details) at the downstream market equilibrium




2 and Qi >Q s. Hence we can directly state the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 The integration of storage decreases the market share of the vertically integrated oil
and gas company (ﬁrm 2): si
2 <s s
2
The integration of the storage allows the supplier 1 to reduce to zero the cost of access to storage.
Consequently, it allows the supplier 1 to restore its position on the downstream market and to improve
its market share.
T h ei n t e r m e d i a t ed e m a n dw r i t e sn o wki =( qi
1)
−1 (Y ) and competition in the intermediate market






e ξ (Y i)
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e ξ (Y i)
≷ 0
This equilibrium structure is the same as in the previous situation. At the equilibrium, the integrated
ﬁrm strategy depends on the balance between the direct and strategic eﬀects (discussed above).
However, the strategic eﬀect depends on qi
2 that is weaker than qs
2. Ceteris paribus,t h i se ﬀect is now
less strong than in the previous situation S. In this case, the integration of storage will reduce the
possibility of an equilibrium with a withdrawal behavior (strategic purchase).
V. The linear case
We compare the two industrial structures using a linear demand function in order to illustrate the
direct and strategic eﬀects presented in the previous sections. More precisely, we assume that the
inverse demand function is given9 by P (Q)=1−Q. In that case, we focus on the strategies of an oil
and gas company when it is active on downstream and upstream markets: it can strategically buy
natural gas on intermediate market in order to raise the cost of the rival ﬁr mw h i c hi so n l yo nt h e
downstream market. This strategy is an equilibrium of the game when the strategic eﬀect dominates
the direct eﬀect.
9This simplistic formulation is broadly used in the vertical relation literature.
6In the industrial structure S, the intermediate market net supply of the integrated oil and gas















When the storage activity is integrated (structure I), the ”withdrawal” and ”foreclosure” equilibria
are the only one possible. More precisely, a ”withdrawal” equilibrium emerges for a<1
6 − i















(1 − 6a − 2i)
For a>1
6 − i
3, the ”strategic eﬀect” balances with the ”direct eﬀect” and the integrated ﬁrm chooses
strategic foreclosure, yi
2 =0 . The supply of the distributor 1 is yi
1 = 1
6 (1 − 2i). It is strictly positive
if the price of injection is not too high (here i ≤ 1
2).
The integration of the storage with a downstream supplier induces a reduction of the strategic
purchases of ﬁrm 2 on the intermediate market and it consequently involves a reduction of the
allocative distortion. This reduction is all the stronger as access to storage prices (for withdrawal
and injection) are high.
Proposition 2 The integration of the storage with a downstream supplier induces an increase of the
intermediate market price, ki ≥ ks.
Proof. The prices on the intermediate market are written as ks = 5
16(1 − 2a + 6
5i) and ki =
5
16 − 3
8 (a − i). Straightforwardly, we see here that ki = ks + 1
4a which yields the result.
This result is not surprising anymore because the integration of storage reduces the level of
strategic purchases. In fact, this increase in the intermediate price level stems from the demand
increase of the distributor 1. As a matter of fact, the distributor 1 increases his demand on the
i n t e r m e d i a t em a r k e tb e c a u s eh ei sm o r ee ﬃcient after integration with the storage operator (he
internalizes one margin).
Proposition 3 The integration of the storage activity with a downstream supplier improves the wel-
fare (because it lowers the ﬁnal prices).
One can see as a proof that the increase of the intermediate market price due to the vertical
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This result emerges because the vertical structure is more eﬃcient (less costly) with the integration
of the storage. This "eﬃciency eﬀect" dominates the eﬀect of the intermediate price level on the ﬁnal
price. In this case, increasing intermediate price doesn’t involve increasing ﬁnal price.
10Details are simple but fastidious, so we omit them. They are available on the web page: http://www.sceco.univ-
montp1.fr/creden/Poudou/Poudou.htm
7VI. Conclusion
In this article, we discuss some questions concerning third party access to the storage capacities. In
the framework of the industrial structures considered, two main results have been shown:
• ﬁrst, the storage facilities can be strategically used by the oil and gas companies active on the
upstream and downstream markets. Theses integrated ﬁrms have incentives to buy natural gas
on intermediate market (represented by the activity of storage). In this way, the behavior of
oil and gas companies has an impact on the natural gas demand on the intermediate market.
In this context, access to storage facilities allows integrated ﬁrms to adjust strategically the
gas price on downstream market. It allows to raise the cost of the rival ﬁrms that buy natural
gas in order to supply the downstream market. This "raising rival cost" strategy induces some
distortions and reduces the welfare.
• Second, the integration of storage activity with a downstream supplier allows to reduce this
distortion and to improve the welfare.
These two results allow us to make an interesting remark on the optimal regulation of gas markets.
Considering the strategic behavior of oil and gas companies on the storage activity, it is socially
optimal for the regulator to integrate storage and supply activities. Such an integration allows to
compensate for this strategic behavior. More precisely, it lowers the cost supported by the non
integrated supplier with regard to that of the vertically integrated oil and gas companies. This idea
translates the principle of a symmetric regulation: if authorities accept vertical integration of oil and
gas companies, they may also accept vertical integration of the storage activity.
Appendix
S and I downstream market equilibria have a similar structure: in the S situation, relations 1 hold
a n di nt h eI situation, they hold just modifying the ﬁrm’s 1 marginal cost which is only set to k.S o
let qh (x) the downstream production of ﬁrm h when x is the ﬁrm’s 1 cost of production. Using these
notations, S and I productions at the ﬁrm level can now be denoted qs
h = qh (k + a) and qi
h = qh (k).
Then generically a downstream (Cournot) equilibrium (S or I)i sd e ﬁned by
P (Q(x)) − x + P
0 (Q(x))q1 (x)=0
P (Q(x)) + P
0 (Q(x))q2 (x)=0
where Q(x)=q1 (x)+q2 (x).D i ﬀerentiating w.r.t. x and omitting arguments Q and x,g i v e s
½
[P0 (·)+P00 (·)q1](dq1 + dq2)+P0 (·)dq1 = dx > 0
[P0 (·)+P00 (·)q2](dq1 + dq2)+P0 (·)dq2 =0


















where by deﬁnition (see footnote 4) Γ(Q)=2 P (Q)+P0 (Q)Q is a non increasing function of Q ≥ 0.
8Since in the S regime x = k + a but x = k in the I regime, from the comparative statics result
above it is straightforward that




1 = q1 (k)




2 = q2 (k)
Q
s = Q(k + a) <Q(k)=Q
i
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